I thank the Presiding

Officer. I thank the distinguished Senator

from Michigan and my distinguished

friend and colleague from Colorado

for their time.

This is sort of a news update on

Kosovo, if I could describe it that way,

because several Senators have indicated

a strong desire to offer amendments

to this bill in regard to the

United States’ role in Kosovo. I hope

that we won’t do that. We need this bill

to be expedited to send a strong message

to our American men and women

in uniform. This is not to say, however,

that we do not need a frank discussion

of ongoing discussions about the

United States’ role in regard to

Kosovo.

I have, as of 3 o’clock this afternoon—

we are about an hour after

that—the latest report from the peace

talks in Rambouillet, France. Secretary

of State Albright has just indicated

that:

I will go on with this very briefly.

So we have a lull. So the peace talks

can continue. A cynic might say we

drew a line in the sand. And yet, at another

time we have gone beyond that

line in the sand and our credibility is

at stake.

Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary of

Great Britain, called for the parties to

‘‘use these three weeks, use them to

build peace. . . . We have done a lot

here, even if we have not done

enough.’’

The agreement came 11⁄2 hours after

the deadline for the peace conference

had passed. However, in regard to the

Serbs, the news is not that good, to say

the least. Their Deputy Prime Minister

has described the talks as a bust, blaming

the United States officials, who he

said ‘‘want the blood of the Serbs.’’

He said, ‘‘I am afraid the Rambouillet

conference failed and we must say

very clearly who is guilty for that. But

peace appeared as elusive’’—right during

these talks, Mr. President. ‘‘New

fighting’’—or continued fighting. Actually,

it is old and continued and new

fighting—‘‘broke out between the

Yugoslav army troops and the Serb police

and the ethnic Albanian rebels.’’

So we still have war.

The reason I brought all of that up is

that there was an article in Monday’s

Washington Post written by Dr. Henry

Kissinger. I think Dr. Kissinger has

pretty well summed up some of the

concerns, at least, and the frustrations

that many Senators have in regard to

the lack of clarity in regard to the situation

in Kosovo. And, of course, it affects

everything we do in the Balkans,

not to mention Bosnia.

Dr. Kissinger said this:

But in Kosovo, Dr. Kissinger certainly

pointed out that option doesn’t

exist. There are no ethnic dividing

lines and both sides actually claim the

entire territory. Our attitude, the U.S.

attitude toward the Serbs attempts to

insist that their claim has been made

plain. It is the threat of bombing. But

how do we and NATO react to Albanian

transgressions? Are we prepared to

fight both sides and for how long?

As a matter of fact, Secretary

Albright indicated if the Albanians

didn’t get along, we could not bomb the

Serbs. That seems to me to be a little

bit unprecedented and unique. As a

matter of fact, I think it is a little

nutty.

But at any rate, are we prepared to

fight both sides and for how long?

And then Dr. Kissinger goes on, and I

will not take the time of the Senate in

regard to his entire statement, but he

sums up by saying: ‘‘Each incremental

deployment into the Balkans is bound

to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam

Hussein and North Korea.’’

You draw the line in the sand. That

time expires, and it is a problem in

terms of our credibility.

And obviously that is a big concern

on the part of everyone—

I ask unanimous consent that the

full statement of Dr. Kissinger be

printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial

was ordered to be printed in the

RECORD, as follows:

The reason that I

brought this up is that we have several

Senators who are considering amendments

on Kosovo. One I think would

simply say that the Congress would

have to vote before any deployment of

any American pilot in any kind of a

military mission and/or ground troops

would set foot on Kosovo. That is the

extra step, if you will, to certainly include

the Congress in any decisionmaking.

But I would point out to my

colleagues, and I made mention of this

when I spoke on behalf of this bill, i.e.,

the bill in regard to retirement reform

and pay reform, and I pointed out that

we have in the law—and let me just

point out it is Public Law 105–262, October

17, 1998. It is a public law, and the

President signed it. And there is section

8115(a), and we say:

And I want my colleagues to understand

this. This is the law of the land.

And the National Security Council is

aware of this. As a matter of fact, my

staff just an hour ago contacted the

staff at the National Security Council,

and we said, ‘‘Where is the report?’’ We

keep hearing about progress and incremental

steps or lack of progress with

the peace talks and yet we have 4,000,

5,000, maybe 7,000 American troops

ready to deploy in regard to Kosovo.

This requires the administration to

come to the Congress and report on the

following things:

That is pretty basic. Does our involvement

really involve our vital national

security interests? Can a case be

made?

Now, the President spoke to it in

terms of his radio address. I think that

is good. That is the first time he has

spoken to it on national radio. But we

really need to know why is our intervention

in Kosovo in our vital national

security interests? Is it the future of

NATO? I think so to some degree. Are

we talking about we don’t want another

Palestine in the middle of Central

Europe? I know that. But vital national

security interests? I don’t know.

Mr. President, the exit strategy—

We are talking about a 3-year engagement

here. This is 4 years in regard

to Bosnia.

Now, I have quite a bit of blood pressure

in this regard since we have spent

literally billions of dollars in Bosnia

but we didn’t pay for it up front. We

didn’t pay for it with a supplemental.

We do pay for it when the pressure

comes on the appropriators to come up

with an emergency funding request. So

we need to find out what the costs

would be in regard to this deployment.

And finally:

I made mention that one of the considerations

why the people are leaving

the service today is the quality of mission,

and we have the situation where

60 percent of our service people today

are married, obviously part of families,

and they go to Bosnia, and perhaps

Kosovo, and the Mideast and Korea,

and we do not have enough people to

really fill those billets now so they are

deployed for 6 months, 9 months, come

back for a month, bang, they are right

over there again, plus the Reserve and

the Guard. That is one of the considerations

in regard to operation tempo,

personnel tempo, as to why people are

leaving the service, but mission quality

is also a good reason. That is No. 8 in

regard to the anticipated effects of the

deployment on the morale, the retention

and effectiveness of U.S. forces.

Now, we say if there is an emergency

here in terms of our national security,

obviously the President can intercede.

Now, I want to see this report. We

met with Secretary Albright, Secretary

Cohen, and our national security

director, Sandy Berger, about 2

weeks ago during the impeachment

trial. It was early in the morning. We

made them aware of this particular

provision in this report. Now, I understand

from staff of the NSC that a report

will be coming, because in the

words of the staff member, ‘‘There is a

lull over in Kosovo.’’ We have a 3 week

time period to try to work something

else out in regard to the peace agreement.

Let me just point out something, Mr.

President. The Secretary of State said

that we would not commit American

men and women to a peacekeeping role

in Kosovo unless there were benchmarks

for peace. I would only remind

this administration and my colleagues,

on behalf of all those in the military,

that if you are a peacekeeper, there

better be a peace to keep because when

there is not a peace to keep, you become

a target. That is a whole different

situation.

So, consequently, I am very hopeful

that the National Security Council will

be coming forth with this report and

giving the report to our leadership and

the appropriate committee chairs. Since this is the law, perhaps we can

think about delaying any other amendments

to this bill in regard to the

Kosovo situation.

I yield the floor.